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Improving Labor Relations Performance Using A Simplified Drum
Buffer Rope (S-DBR) Technique
The purpose of this research is to describe an implementation of Simplified Drum
Buffer Rope (S-DBR), a scheduling methodology under Theory of Constrains (TOC), in
service operations of a U.S. military base. In doing so, this research contributes in two
ways. For practitioners, this research is the first to show how S-DBR methodology can
be utilized to improve the performance of labor relations. For academicians, this
research is one of only a few to address the how questions of S-DBR use in a service
context.
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1.0 Introduction
The United States Congress established the Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC)
commission to make recommendations for optimizing military installations. BRAC
evaluates military bases on competitiveness such as delivery, quality, and labor
(relations); and makes recommendations for base closures and realignment (Ewing, et
al. 2006). Previous rounds of BRAC recommendations have resulted in a total of 119
base closures and realignment of 87 infrastructure functions (Otal and Melhuish, 2013).
Through the tool of public law, the United States Congress is likely to mandate the next
BRAC in the year 2017. Given the real possibility of closures, it is imperative for each
military base to justify its value and efficiency to the defence of the U.S. A key
determinant is the labor relations efficiency of base operations. Due to its recent annual
reviews, a military base in the southern U.S. – hereafter referred to as the ‘Base’ – was
aware that its labor performance was historically worse than bases located in other parts
of the country. Specifically, the Base’s employee/management conflict resolution time,
part of its labor relations performance measures (e.g. time to resolve grievance issues
and execute disciplinary decisions) was not competitive when compared with similar
bases. The Base’s performance averaged 30 days over the 12 months of FY 2013, while
several similar bases in the north and west were achieving 10 - 20 days. In order to
increase competitiveness, the Base tried improvements from various internal and
external sources since 2010. All of the programs had either worsened performance or
achieved marginal success. A program begun in January 2014, based on a Simplified
Drum Buffer Rope (S-DBR) control system finally led to improved performance from a
mean of 30 to 10 days. This made the Base one of the best in the system for labor
conflict resolution time.
S-DBR is one scheduling methodology developed under Theory of Constraints
(TOC) principles that emphasizes the control of execution or job release into the system
as a mechanism to improve performance (Schragenheim, et al., 2009). The purpose of
this research is to describe how the S-DBR implementation improved labor relations
performance. This paper extends the use of S-DBR to a new service area and
application not in extant literature. It is unique in that while many researchers have
conceptually argued that S-DBR is a viable option for a variety of service or
manufacturing operations (Chang and Hwang, 2011). In fact, some have argued that the
concept of effective controlled release can save lives. For example, early in 2014, many
U.S. veterans died waiting for medical care because the Veteran Administration (VA)

Hospitals administrators failed to control the release of critical cases for urgent medical
care, thus clogging the system (Cooper, 2014). While our case study is not lifethreatening, it does affect employment for thousands of workers through improved labor
relations. However, there is a paucity of research answering how it works in services.
In doing so, this research contributes in two ways. First, for practitioners, this research
describes how S-DBR can be implemented in service operations, specifically to
improve labor relations. Second, for academicians, this research answers the how
questions important to extending theory to a new area.
In the next section, we provide a brief literature review of TOC principles and SDBR characteristics. In sections three and four, we provide a description of the
methodology and field experiment for S-DBR implementation. In section five, we write
our implementation experience (or case study) and, in section six, we provide results of
the implementation. In section seven, we provide implications of our implementation
experience including conclusions from this study.

2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Theory of Constraints (TOC) Principles
More than 30 years ago TOC was a controversial development by Eli Goldratt as
theoretical underpinnings for his Optimized Production Technology (OPT) software
which he used as a shop floor control mechanism. TOC gained popularity after the
publication of two books namely – ‘The Goal’ (Goldratt and Cox 1984), which
delineated the basic principles of TOC and, subsequently, ‘The Race’ (Goldratt and Fox
1986), which described the DBR methodology. Over the years an interest in applying
DBR has steadily grown among researchers that helped define the contexts in which it
is most successful (e.g., Umble and Srikanth, 1990; Darlington, et al., 2014). TOC
works by identifying an internal constraint (or Capacity Constraint Resource – CCR) in
a process and then uses a DBR control methodology to manage work flow through the
process based on the capacity of the constraint. An important concept in DBR is the
presumed existence of a constraint on which to optimally manage the work flow.
However, Rahman (1998) finds that not all processes contain internal constraints on
which to base DBR. For these organizations the constraint on throughput is external,
i.e. customer demand. For these situations, Schragenheim and Dettmer (2000) proposed
Simplified -DBR, which is a variation of DBR, but still anchored in TOC principles.

See Schragenheim (2010)’s work for an extensive discussion of the differences between
DBR and S-DBR methodologies.

2.2 Simplified Drum Buffer Rope (S-DBR)
The application of S-DBR is intended to control process flows in systems where there is
no internal bottleneck, but instead the constraint is external customer or client demand.
This differentiates it from DBR which assumes an internal constraint. While many
authors (e.g., Simons and Simpson, 1997; Goldratt, et al., 2002; Schragenheim, et al.,
2009) have conceptually described S-DBR, there is a paucity of research empirically
testing real-world implementations for how it works. For this reason, Goldratt (2006)
developed a Strategy and Tactics (S&T) tree to guide S-DBR implementation.For
further information on the use of S&T see Scheinkopf (2010).
According to Scheinkopf (2010), the S-DBR implementation consists of five
elements: (1) Choking the Releases, (2) Managing the Priorities, (3) Dealing with
Capacity Constraint Resource (CCR), (4) Load Control, and (5) Process Of On Going
Improvement (POOGI) – i.e. systematically improving flow. S-DBR methodology
utilizes Buffer Management (BM) concepts, which divide the time buffers into three
regions namely Region I, II, and III. According to Chakravorty (2001), consumption of
buffer in Region III is considered to be normal and no specific action is necessary;
consumption of buffer in Region II implies jobs are somewhat late, monitoring is
necessary, and consumption of buffer in Region I indicates that jobs are late and
expediting is necessary. Limited in the service literature, Huang et al. (2011)
demonstrates the S-DBR implementation in production operations. This study is unique
because it is the first to examine an S-DBR implementation in the context of service
operations to improve labor relations performance. This extends the use of S-DBR to a
new area to solve a unique problem.
According to Schragenheim and Dettmer (2000) S-DBR is appropriate when,
1) Failure to meet the existing demand on the system will result in decreasing future
demand. This applies to the Base since a department can’t meet current demand, they
will soon be out of business.
2) There is no internal constraint in the system – instead the constraint is external, i.e.
there is unused internal resource capacity that can handle existing demand. This differs
from DBR where true internal constraints are assumed. This applies to the grievance
resolution process because the current capacity can meet demand,

3) Small changes to process routing will not create a capacity constraint on any
resource. Since no labor reduction will take place, the existing capacity will be
maintained and the implementation of S-DBR, discussed later, did not create a
constraint in the long-term, a quarter or a year.
4) The planned load is assumed to be within the capabilities of existing resources, i.e.
you don’t intentionally plan to overload the system. The S-DBR is designed to match
capacity with demand and not overload the system.
In short, S-DBR sets the external demand as the Drum, and the Rope signals a release of
a new case to a LR or SR specialist only as a case is completed. In DBR, an internal
constraint (internal Drum and Rope) controls the release. As a side-note, the Base had
tried using Lean, Six Sigma, and DBR to address the labor resolution problem, but they
did not work either practically or conceptually. Conceptually they failed because they
are focused on eliminating waste and increasing the capacity of internal processes,
which is not true of DBR. Since the internal capacity of the labor resolution processes
were sufficient these programs led to no improvement in resolution time.”

3.0 Methodology
3.1 Case Study
Since S-DBR has not been previously applied to improve labor relations performance,
and labor relations conflict time is a key indicator of Base labor performance used by
BRAC (Wright, et al, 2006), a case study examining the possible effects is appropriate.
The case describes the six-month implementation of S-DBR to answer how it worked to
improve labor relations performance in a service context. While many conceptual,
simulation, and analytical studies describe what S-DBR is and model where and when it
works, none describe how it works in a service context to improve the labor relations
process. According to Childe (2011) case studies are appropriate for extending theory
or application to a new context. Childe also emphasizes the need for research to be
practical, which requires explanation of how a theory works to practitioners. In this
case, S-DBR is important because poor labor relations performance can contribute to
the Base’s higher risk for closure, with a corresponding loss of jobs and economic
vitality for the region.

3.2 The Base
The Base has over 18,000 unionized employees and military personnel working in two
departments, Maintenance and Support, performing various vehicle, general equipment,
and electronics maintenance functions for a variety of military operations. The
Maintenance department is divided into, a) vehicle maintenance group (AMXG), b)
commodities maintenance group (CMXG), and c) electronics maintenance group
(EMXG). The Support department is responsible for directing essential base operations
such as security, vehicle management, fuel, and plant services. A majority of the Base’s
employees are described as “skilled” workers and are represented in collective
bargaining by the American Federal Government Employees (AFGE) Union – hereafter
referred to as the ‘Union’. As part of the collective bargaining agreement, the Base
maintains three labor relations offices that collect and process conflicts between the
Base command structure (management) and labor. The offices house labor relations
specialists who handle a variety of conflicts.

3.3 Data Collection
The data for the case study was collected in a participant-observer manner (Yin, 2013),
where the researchers not only observed each activity in the study but also led the early
stages of the S-DBR implementation system-wide, before the program was assigned to
the supervisors. First, the organizational structures for the Maintenance and Support
departments are diagrammed, with descriptions and job titles of all personnel involved
in the labor relations process. This shows the chain of command and string of approvals
necessary to complete a labor action. Second, a spaghetti-diagram is used showing the
work flow and documentation involved in the process. A spaghetti diagram is a Six
Sigma tool used to graphically visualize actual flow through a process, rather than what
it should be or is estimated to be. “It is a snapshot in time so it may not include all whatif and special scenarios.” (www.six-sigma-material.com; page 1) Third, descriptive
statistics are collected on the flow-time data for processing and completing a labor
grievance case under both experimental conditions and eventual performance results for
the case study.

3.4 Labor Relations Process
The Base employs two types of specialists to handle three categories of labor issues
involving employee/management conflicts; namely Labor Relations (LR) specialists

who handle only grievance cases, and Employee Relations (ER) specialists who handle
only disciplinary cases, and some miscellaneous cases (e.g., Congressional Inquiries or
Inspector General Complaints). A grievance is an employee complaint of unfair
treatment, a breach of collective bargaining agreements, a misapplication of law, or a
condition-of-employment violation. Generally, disciplinary action is seen primarily as a
corrective measure, aimed at preventing further misconduct or poor performance. The
most common types of disciplinary action are warnings, and in serious cases, dismissal;
however, disciplinary action can sometimes mean suspension from work, or the removal
of certain privileges, or, in rare instances, demotion. To be lawful, disciplinary action
or dismissals must be fair and reasonable.

3.5 Labor Relations Challenges
The Base processes labor relations grievance claims using a process this study refers to
as Scenario 1. Scenario 1 represents the current labor case practice where a LR or ER
specialist handles multiple cases at once, working on as many four-five cases
simultaneously, with an additional 20 or so in queue. The Base has many challenges
when trying to execute grievance and disciplinary cases using Scenario 1, which include
a complex organizational structure, convoluted work flow, and inefficient work
handling. Complex organizational structures include physically separate buildings for
basic functions (Figure 1). Under the Maintenance Group Commander, there is a
Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) which maintains two separate offices in different
locations to perform identical LR and ER activities. Under the Support Group
Commander, there is a single Management Support (MS) office, which handles both LR
and ER cases. Also, the MS office assigns management representatives, known as
Designated Management Official (DMO), to different groups such as AMXG or
CMXG. With two commanders and layers of management in between, with three
supervisors; it is a difficult environment for sound and timely labor conflict resolution.
The situation is further exacerbated because the three offices are located in different
buildings. For the most part the specialists working in these offices work independently
with little or no interaction, creating a propensity to make locally optimal decisions that
benefit one office, in deference to the others. There is no encouragement to cooperate
to seek solutions which can benefit the Base as a whole. In addition, there is no
interactive learning (cross-training) among LR and ER specialists, which harms their
promotion opportunities because they are unaware of activities in other departments.

(Insert Figure 1: Organizational Structure)

After a grievance or disciplinary case is filed, they are processed in a convoluted
work flow, meaning that there is little standardization in completing virtually identical
tasks. A spaghetti diagram showing representative work flow is shown in Figure 2. The
diagram shows, for example, at AMXG the DMO typically receives disciplinary or
grievance cases first. Immediately, the disciplinary case is forwarded to the ER office
and a grievance is forwarded to the MS office. At times, DMO may instead forward the
case to LR office (to begin step 1). While coordinating with AFGE, the LR office may
send the case back to the DMO. At other times, the LR Office, after completing step 2,
sends the case back to MS. As the diagram shows, there is no apparent benefit to
having different work flows and standardizing tasks should lead to improved
performance. Instead, documents are handled multiple times through the same office,
and often returned and rerouted after no action is taken. As the work flow varies among
the different offices some cases are lost, causing further delays. Significant delays can
be very costly, frustrating the employees who must show daily progress on each case,
and embarrassing to the Base through poor labor relations and delayed case resolution
time. In addition, labor relations with the LR and ER specialists are also affected
because the convoluted work flow causes an imbalance in workload among the offices.
In other words, one set of specialists may have too many cases and thus struggle to
make, deliver and execute decisions, while other specialists have little to do. Since the
offices are physically separate, there is no cross-training or visibility of workload to
commanders or supervisors thus making it difficult to fairly balance workload among
the offices even when the opportunity arises.

(Insert Figure 2: Resolution Process Flow)

Due to the multiple ‘touches’ required by each specialist and office, inefficiency
in handling cases is created. In Scenario 1 LR or ER specialists are assigned cases as
soon as they arrive to the office – clogging their inboxes with an average of 20 cases per
specialist in queue at any given time (Mean = 19.8, Std Dev = 4.5 cases, Range = 0 35). This creates the need to multi-task across cases to show progress on each one,
which according to Lindbeck and Snower (1996) reduces efficiency. This inhibits a

commander’s ability to track progress on any case and delays their ability to render a
decision and thus harms the Base’s labor relations performance.

4.0 The S-DBR Implementation - Case Study
The Base agreed to implement the S-DBR mechanism to control the release of
grievances to the specialists. In doing so, the commander made three key policy changes
that 1) allowed the researchers to co-locate all specialists in a single office, 2) allowed
the researchers to control the release of cases to the specialists and 3) eliminated the
requirement for specialists demonstrate daily progress on each case. This study refers to
the revised process as Scenario 2. It is important to note here that prior to S-DBR the
Base tried many techniques over the years to improve labor relations performance, but
were unsuccessful in either achieving improvement or sustaining an improvement after
a few weeks. Some popular approaches included basic TOC/DBR, Lean, and Six
Sigma, among others. Please refer to Womack and Jones, (2003) for a detailed
description of Lean tools and Pyzdek and Keller (2009) for Six Sigma tools. Some
reasons for the failure of these programs are not directly applicable to the S-DBR
implementation but some relevant findings related to their failures are discussed later in
this study. One issue with previous efforts that weighed in the Base’s decision to
perform a full roll-out of S-DBR include the commander’s willingness to try a unified
effort across all three offices. Previous efforts were ran by individual offices, so
consequently the offices rarely worked together to integrate efforts. One objective of
the implementation is to try the same S-DBR method across all offices and specialists at
the same time so that synergy can develop and specialists can support and learn from
each other. The next section of this study describes How S-DBR was implemented,
including the preliminary activities to fulfil the assumptions necessary for using S-DBR.

4.1 Specialists & Office Reconfiguration to Support S-DBR
The implementation progressed in four distinct phases. In the first phase, the focus was
on the training of the ER and LR specialists on the Scenario 2 method and the basics of
S-DBR. In the second phase, the workflow was analyzed and a new process and cellular
configuration was developed to process cases to support the S-DBR. In the third phase,
the three offices were physically relocated to a single location to support a cell structure
for the specialist’s work flow. In the fourth phase, the S-DBR mechanism was
implemented to control workflow to the cells. At first, the researchers managed the

release of cases to the service cells, then the supervisors took over and the researchers
only observed the process.
To improve the acceptance of the new system among specialists and their
supervisors, the Base commander requested that all employees affected by the change to
participate in a one-day training on the basics of Constraint Management and
specifically S-DBR and how it should improve their work performance. During this
training phase, much of the statistical and analytical components were excluded because
the authors found that the majority of the specialists did not possess the background or
the academic preparation to fully understand such tools. Instead, the authors used many
training techniques including illustrations, examples, and interactive simulation games
to provide practice in the basics of the S-DBR process that have shown to be effective
by other researchers (e.g. Chakravorty and Verhoeven, 1996). Essentials of the training
program included the five focusing steps of TOC, DBR, and Buffer Management,
concept of the 7-wastes, process and value-stream mapping, and applying a five-step
scientific method of problem-solving including: a) identify the problem, b) gather and
analyze information, c) generate alternative solutions, d) prioritize and implement the
best solutions, and e) follow-up to ensure it worked. This approach is similar to Six
Sigma’s approach of define, measure, analyze, improve, and control; and Lean’s plan,
do, check, act; among others. During the training, specialists interacted for hours,
developing strategies (e.g., ideas to eliminate multi-tasking), simulating work flow, and
then the authors discussed how these strategies are applied to improve labor relations
performance.
In the second phase the analysis showed that based on the workload there was
no internal constraint, and therefore the S-DBR implementation was justified. However,
it is important to note here that while the grievance resolution times were artificially
truncated to the closest quarter-hour there is variety among the times because a
grievance can be filed for a number of reasons, with each case resulting in a different
cycle time. For example, grievances can be filed for hundreds of issues ranging from
trivial verbal reprimands to serious issues such as harassment or termination-for-cause.
Resolutions can often take less than an hour or several days and weeks, depending the
process and potential impact. The analysis revealed that approximately 75% of the
workload consisted of grievances/discipline cases, and about 25% of the remaining
workload consisted of miscellaneous cases, such as Congressional inquiries or Inspector
General (IG) complaints that were often expedited.

In the Base, a cell was developed

to handle the grievance and disciplinary cases called a “service cell” and a second cell
type was developed to handle the miscellaneous cases called a “specialized cell.” Each
service cell included one LR specialist and one ER specialist so that all cells can handle
both grievance and discipline cases. Training and practice was provided on the role of
each specialist in a cell, as well as how the concept of a Scenario 2 service cell differs
from their traditional practice. The intent is for the LR and ER specialists to cross-train
each other so that over-time flexibility is improved, where either LR or ER specialists
can perform both duties and assist in managing peak workload. Considering the
existing workload and expertise of individuals in the three offices, 10 service cells are
required. One larger specialized cell with three-five specialists can handle all of the
typical miscellaneous cases. Figure 3 shows the cell organization.
In the third phase, the offices were relocated to a cellular configuration that
supported the model in Figure 3. All LRs and ERS were relocated to one central
building, and then the two specialists were chosen for each cell based on skills and
seniority.

(Insert Figure 3: Service Cells)

In the fourth phase, the S-DBR control was implemented. The reporting
structure is narrowed by reducing the number of supervisors from three to two. The two
who were selected had previously worked as successful LR and ER specialists and had
received supervisory training at the Base. The third supervisor is no longer needed
since all specialists are in the same office. The structure is then flattened so that the
supervisors report directly to the Deputy Commander of the Support department; who
reports directly to the Commander. The old structure included individuals that are in
the chain only for ‘information purposes’ and not approvals, but because the workflow
in Scenario 1 is sequential, cases are delayed waiting for mere notification sign-offs,
and not for value-added activities such as approvals or content reviews.
S-DBR also requires a buffer management system, which is typically managed
in manufacturing through information technology. A range of options for information
technology was considered but the specialists suggested using Microsoft Excel. A
decision was made to designate an individual specialist responsible for managing the
buffer with daily input from the supervisors. The S-DBR implementation followed five
of the elements 4.1.1 – 4.1.5. In the labor resolution process, the buffer exists to ensure

that the specialists are busy on cases that are prioritized by the Base commander, and to
ensure that the cells remain busy with relevant cases. Because there are several cells,
routings can occasionally vary based on a specialists expertise, again justifying the use
of a buffer.

4.1.1 Choking the Release
To prevent multi-tasking the Base eliminated its policy of requiring specialists to work
on each case daily. Instead of relying on the specialists to choose the cases – which
encourages multi-tasking, the S-DBR system uses input control – where a single case is
assigned to a specialist until it is completed. This is called controlled release, versus a
non-controlled release as seen in Scenario 1 where cases pile-up in specialists inboxes
as they arrive. The implementation of controlled-release began with entering cases into
an Excel spreadsheet. Each case is assigned a due date and ordered in the Excel sheet
based on the type of grievance and expected resolution time. Occasionally the Base
commander will select cases for higher priority. The cases are released to a LR/SR
specialist cell which manages the case until completed. Simple grievances can often be
completed quickly, and most cells have slack time sufficient to prevent a case from
missing its due date. During low demand periods, the cases are normally released
quickly, but during peak periods, the cases may stay in the buffer for the full term.
Controlled release requires four steps. Step one is setting the buffer size. The
average time to complete grievance/disciplinary cases is 30 days. To avoid
consequences of missing deadlines, specialists artificially added slack to each
intermediate step of grievance/disciplinary process. This ensured that the deadlines
were not tightened which would make the specialists jobs more difficult. With no
historical data to guide them, the commanders arbitrarily set a buffer size of 50%,
meaning that with typical demand, where no buffer was consumed, a case should be
complete in 15 days. This is considered an aggressive and somewhat impractical target,
because the number of submitted cases can vary widely from day-to-day, making it
impossible to consume the buffer in higher demand periods. As discussed before, a key
performance measure is the time to resolve labor conflicts, which is correlated with the
cost and resources involved. Because of this, it is essential that the Base decrease the
time to deliver and execute resolutions in less than 30 days.
The second step in controlled release involves generating a release schedule of
cases to maintain the targeted buffer sizes. Generally, the release follows a First-In-

First-Out (FIFO) priority rule; however, supervisors frequently assign higher priority to
some cases that potentially have high impacts. For example, some labor issues affect
only one worker, while other disputes may affect a whole department.
The third step in controlled release is enforcing the release schedule. LR and ER
specialists can circumvent the S-DBR system for their own benefits if not constrained.
For example, if left to their personal preferences, employees can choose the easier cases
to work on (a.k.a. cherry picking), instead of following FIFO. Supervisors can also
circumvent the system through favoritism, by assigning easier or more visible cases to
preferred specialists instead of fairly balancing the workload across service cells. Some
service cells can get overloaded, causing unnecessary delays, while others become
starved.
The fourth step is freezing excessive WIP (limiting cases in process) to prevent
clogging the system. It is possible that supervisors can release cases early ahead of
schedule to fill available capacity during low demand periods – when some cells aren’t
busy. But when released early the queues fill quickly, and once demand picks up the
cells again become congested with incomplete cases. Case resolution time again
increases and labor relations performance drops, forcing the specialists to again multitask to show progress. To prevent this in S-DBR, cases must be released only in the
order established in the buffer to ensure that multi-tasking and load imbalance does not
occur. This decision was received by the service cells with mixed feelings.
Traditionally overloaded specialists are pleased that their workload will decrease, but
under-loaded specialists are apprehensive because their workload will likely increase.
Now that service cells have both LRs and ERs, any cell can process virtually any case.

4.1.2 Managing the Priorities
Managing priorities refers to the sequencing of cases to be released to the cells. Both the
FIFO and expedited cases must be tracked and released according to established
priorities. It is important to remember that over the course of a quarter there was no
internal constraint after the specialist cells were created; therefore, in low and typical
demand periods cases are released quickly to the cells, limiting the benefits of the
buffer. However, during heavier demand periods the demand temporarily exceeds the
capacity of the cells, increasing the buffer, and creating capacity constraint resources
(CCRs). The buffer becomes congested, thus creating the need to use controlled release.
A number of issues can create spikes in demand including filing deadlines, statues of

limitations, and expedition by commanders. During the peak periods, the buffer
prevents clogging the cells.
The Base accomplished the objectives of managing priorities in two steps. First
step was to establish buffer zones to implement priorities. That was accomplished by
dividing the 15 day buffer into three regions from low, medium, and high priority –
typically labelled Region III, Region II, and Region I. In order to update the buffer, the
supervisors held a buffer meeting at 9:00 AM daily. The supervisors released the
highest priority cases to the cells first, then the cases with the earliest submission dates.
Only then were the lower cases released – still one-at-a-time. This ensures that the
workload is reasonable and fair and as a result the method used to evaluate specialist’s
performance was revised. Under Scenario 1, specialists were evaluated on criteria that
had no relationship to the labor relations resolution time used for the Base. Instead,
they were evaluated based on trivial items such as the number of mistakes on paperwork
(mostly minor in nature), their tardiness and lateness records, etc. These criteria were
not only unrelated to the resolution time performance, but also harmed the morale of the
units, some of the LR and ER specialists to file labor grievances. For example, even
though all service/specialized cell members worked a full eight hours/day, the
supervisors spent most of their time tracking and documenting trivial infractions. This
includes being 10 minutes late to work or taking an extra 13 minutes for lunch, etc.
Once incurred, the specialists were consistently reminded of these infractions. Even
when there was a lower case load, specialists were afforded no job flexibility; however,
when their case load was higher thus requiring them to work through breaks or lunch supervisors gave no credit toward their performance.
The second step is sustaining management through the new buffer protocols.
During spikes in demand the buffer becomes congested which results in a propensity
among the supervisors to revert back to the old system – to flood the cells with cases to
keep specialists from being idle. They were afraid of being perceived as not doing their
job if workers don’t stay constantly busy – a traditional concept long refuted by
Deming (1986) and Goldratt and Cox (1986). This frustrated the cell members and
seriously harmed morale. The Base commanders had to openly support the new buffer
protocol and consistently reinforce it with the supervisors. They began participating in
many of the service/specialized cell activities and finally developed operating principles
for managing the cells. After two months, the situation gradually improved and
supervisors strictly followed the buffer rules. If a case is placed in Region I, implying

that it is late or immediate action is necessary, the supervisor can shorten breaks,
schedule overtime or, contact other departments for temporary assistance.
Occasionally, since the supervisors had ER and LR experience, they directly provided
necessary assistance to the service cell and expedited the completion of the case.
Otherwise, they were flexible with work schedules and did not penalize the specialists
for minor infractions.

4.1.3 Dealing with CCR
In the TOC literature, a temporary bottleneck called a Capacity Constraint Resource
(CCR) can develop. A CCR is harmful because it’s a short-term bottleneck that inhibits
flow that is difficult to detect a priori. A CCR requires immediate corrective action or
performance can quickly deteriorate. In this S-DBR implementation the legal
department is the CCR. An analysis revealed that during heavy case loads the legal
department got behind, which delayed all downstream processes. Traditionally, the
staffing of the legal department was determined based on the average yearly demand
instead of peak periods, and cases were processed based on FIFO. Since the buffer
schedule to the service cells does not consider the variety in legal requirements, the
FIFO priority rule did not work well. The legal department became overwhelmed with
cases and reached out to their counterparts on other bases for temporary assistance. The
Base decided to modify the release schedule for all the cases to include the legal
department.

For typical cases, the FIFO rule was still employed, but not for expedited

cases. To alleviate the issue during peak demand, he Base added two additional legal
experts, and thus the department rarely experienced CCR status, which is an important
assumption in S-DBR.

4.1.4 Load Control
In order to implement a successful S-DBR implementation the work load needs to be
monitored and adjusted each morning to ensure the cells are working on the highest
priority cases first.. The purpose is to ensure that the system is not overloaded. Due to
the seasonality in case loads, supervisors had some visibility of peak demand. For
example, following the labor appraisals in January, there is an increase in the number of
grievance cases filed in February and March by workers who feel that they are unfairly
treated. During the daily buffer meetings in March 2014 however, the supervisors
discovered that there was an unusually large increase (about 35%) in grievance cases

which could not be handled with the existing cell capacities. The commander
discovered that other Bases were more proactive in preventing labor conflicts from
becoming formal grievances. For example, when maintenance workers are dissatisfied
with their annual appraisals they can file an informal grievance with Human Resources
(HR). The maintenance supervisor has 10 business days to respond to the grievance and
either satisfy the worker without further action or allow a formal grievance to proceed.
If the employee is satisfied, then their complaint does not become a formal grievance.
No harm is done to labor resolution time performance. If the employee is not satisfied,
only then does the complaint become a legitimate grievance case, and required to be
forwarded to a service cell. Some Bases acted more proactively by establishing
personal relationships between HR, management, and labor representatives thus
preventing many disputes from becoming grievance cases.

4.1.5 POOGI – Systematically Improving Flow
The POOGI improvement program was implemented with the buffer management
system. Every two weeks, the supervisors performed Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
(Pyzdek and Keller, 2009) to pinpoint improvement opportunities. Root Cause Analysis
is a traditional method used in many programs to discover the cause of an observed
phenomenon - for the purpose of controlling/influencing the phenomenon. For
example, for processes consuming too much of the buffer, a group of service cells
developed a process map of disciplinary cases. The longest non value-added activity is
in the legal department, where the cases are placed in queue until an attorney is
available to review and make a recommendation. During peak periods when the legal
department was a CCR, the time in queue represented 80% of the total process time.
In addition to TOC and S-DBR, over time, a variety of tools were taught to
managers, supervisors, and service cells, including Six Sigma (Pyzdek and Keller,
2009), and Lean Methods (Deming, 1986). Several specialists earned their Six Sigma
Green Belt. The supervisors along with service cells applied a common Lean tool Statistical Process Control (SPC) - to the throughput of cases, and found two cells that
were under performing. The results of a Cause/Effect diagram found that these service
cells were unhappy with the changes and were subsequently moved to another office.

5.0 Results of S-DBR Implementation
This section describes How S-DBR led to improved labor resolution time.

5.1 Tangible Benefits
S-DBR demonstrated a 37.5% decrease in the elapsed time to process a labor resolution
case. Following the S-DBR implementation across all specialists, the timeline to render
decisions on discipline/grievances cases dropped from an average of 30 days to 10 after
the first six months, a drop of 66.7%. The monthly standard deviation is 4.5 days. This
suggests that S-DBR can improve service operations as it does in manufacturing.
There are two primary reasons explaining how the program improved labor
resolution time; first, the S-DBR allowed supervisors to control the work flow, to
sequence cases to the specialists based on submission date or case priority. Releasing
cases based on FIFO logic from the buffer limited the cherry-picking opportunities, the
build-up of cases at the specialists work stations, and the unbalanced work flow.
Supervisors can track progress on each case to ensure they are processed in a timely
manner and specialists can focus their efforts on a single case until it is resolved,
thereby eliminating multi-tasking. Second, an unexpected result is that after six months
of implementation the number of grievance cases dropped by 22%. Follow-up
interviews gave three primary reasons for the drop in cases; a) the S-DBR effort and its
possible benefits to keep the Base open increased the attention given to the labor
relations process, i.e. the Base leadership signals they care about improving labor
relations; b) the faster grievance resolution time improved overall labor satisfaction,
where there is less informal, i.e. grapevine, conversation centered on the long resolution
time. This is important because BRAC, the board that recommends base closures,
evaluates a decrease in the number of grievance cases as an improvement in
organizational health; and c), due to the unbalanced work load on the specialists, they
filed their own labor grievances. The improved control by the S-DBR had all but
eliminated the workload imbalance and only two grievances from specialists had
occurred during the six months. This contributed to the improved probability that the
Base in the South can compete with the North and West if future closures occur.
Anecdotally, it is possible that some of the improvement occurred because once the
employees heard that the Base is evaluated based on its grievance resolution record, the
fear of closure may have discouraged the number of grievances filings.

6.0 Implications for S-DBR Literature
In addition to the practical benefits to the Base, the findings also have impacts on the SDBR literature. First, this case answers how ‘Choking the Release’ plays an important
role in effectively managing service operations and quantifying its effect on
performance. While over the years studies using conceptual, analytical, and simulation
models shows the importance of controlled release in a number of contexts under titles
such as ‘input/output sequencing ‘, and ‘input control’ (e.g., Baker, 1984; Onur and
Fabrycky, 1987). Reported benefits include reduced work-in-process, resource idleness,
order tardiness, and shop floor congestion, among others (e.g., Fredendall, et al. 2010;
Harrod and Kanet, 2013). The problem is that there is wide variance in reported
analytical and simulated benefits, making it difficult to understand how a real
organization can benefit.
The second implication is that, despite initial difficulties with practically
applying S-DBR in services, violating the buffer rules leads to less visibility for work
loads, inhibits a supervisor’s ability to track progress, and allows congesting the work
space with unresolved cases. The buffer rules require the visible and consistent support
from top management. Field studies (e.g., Liker, 2004) point out that leadership’s
commitment, and their routine participation, is necessary for sustained improvements.
According to Schragenhiem and Ronen (1991), priorities based on the buffer rules
synchronize various activities of operations, which improve their reliability
performance. They view reliability as the degree to which current status becomes an
accurate predictor of future performance. Recovery actions initiated based on
prioritizing demand through buffers can be effectively utilized to protect performance of
operations from unexpected uncertainties.
The next implication is that for S-DBR to be beneficial in services, CCRs must
be present, else immediate release is just as effective. As temporary bottlenecks, CCRs
benefit from buffers because Lawrence and Buss (1994) suggests that providing
protective capacity at the non-bottlenecks (when they are not CCRs) is the “best hope”
for improving the performance of such operations. Our study finds that CCRs can also
be managed in services by making processes more flexible. More case studies are
necessary to understand CCR’s effect and how to effectively manage it to improve the
performance of operations.
The fourth implication is that the load control function of S-DBR is more
important than previously reported. With the 22% reduction in case load created by the

residual benefits of the implementation in the Base, the time period that the cells
became CCRs was reduced thus preventing overloading the system. While prices, etc.
(e.g., Moodie, 1999) have been shown to control workloads in simulations, this is the
first service study to demonstrate how S-DBR controlled the load in a non-consumer
environment, when prices were not the driver of demand. There is a paucity of studies
testing different strategies for load control to prevent overload situations in S-DBR in
service operations.
The fifth implication is that POOGI was implemented for systematically
improving the flow in a manner consistent with a continuous improvement process.
Lean and Six Sigma did not improve its labor resolution process. Lean was helpful in
recognizing obvious waste activities, but the implementation was slower than expected
and the required training was going to take one-year to complete, plus another year to
implement. The Base needed faster results. A Six Sigma program was also attempted,
but the improvements implemented by the Black Belt personnel were not sustainable.
As soon as the Black Belts left the LR and ER offices, performance would deteriorate
and processes migrate back to the old system within a few weeks. This suggests that the
success of improvement programs may be contextual, and not a one-size-fits-all
approach will achieve results. For example, Chakravorty (2011) found that in an
aircraft maintenance division that serviced landing gear, a Six Sigma implementation
failed to achieve results; however, in another division that serviced interiors, Six Sigma
achieved sustained improvement. This study supports the concept that proper
sequencing and the controlled release of cases, or jobs in general, can have huge
impacts on performance.

7.0 Conclusions and Limitations
In complement to empirical models that show the variables and the cause and effect
relationships, case studies describe how the variables interact and why they work to
achieve the desired results. The description of “how” the S-DBR resulted in lower
resolution time is addressed in the results section. These include the preliminary
activities to fulfill the assumptions of using S-DBR, including simplifying the reporting
and departmental structure, and locating the specialists in close proximity to support a
control mechanism that released cases based on external demand. It led to improved
performance because unlike Lean, Six Sigma, and other methods that prevent internal
bottlenecks, S-DBR managed the demand placed on the system. The organization now

uses the S-DBR with other improvement efforts on the Base, often combining Lean and
Six Sigma with S-DBR, which according to the commander has led to the salvaging of
several improvement programs previously abandoned due to poor performance, which
he refers to as the practice of Improvement Systems Recovery.
As with all real-world implementations, a number of issues arise when a process
change is made that can confound the effects on the system (Hales, et al 2008). By
definition, a field experiment can’t be closed-form and isolated. This is a weakness of a
field experiment. Part of the evidence that improvement actually occurred, due to the
reasons specified, is that the stimulus comes before the effect, e.g. Hales, et al (2008).
Therefore several activities could have indirectly contributed to the reported benefits of
S-DBR including the consolidation of the offices, the reduction in the number of
supervisors, and the creation of specialist cells that increased internal capacity.
However, the reported reduction in resolution time did not occur until after the S-DBR
control was added. These changes in offices, supervisors, and cells were not direct
effects, but necessary to fulfil S-DBR assumption # 2, which assumes no internal
constraint or long-term CCR.
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